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Johnson: State v. Reesman

NOTE

STATE V. REESMAN: TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OR A RECIPE FOR MULLIGAN
STEW?1
James D. Johnson*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The first Congress of the United States established the
Fourth Amendment, which guarantees a citizen's rights against
unreasonable searches. 2 It specifies that a warrant authorizing
3
a search will not be issued unless probable cause is established.
To obtain a search warrant, law enforcement must submit an
affidavit to a judicial magistrate specifying what incriminating
evidence the officers expect to find and where they expect to find
it. The officers must provide facts establishing probable cause
*

B.A. University of Montana, 2000; 2004 J.D. Candidate, University of Montana

School of Law. I would like to thank Julie Johnson, Elaine Dahl, and Professor Jeff Renz
for their guidance and assistance.
1. Mulligan Stew is a stew made from bits of various meats and vegetables. THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed., Houghton Mifflin

Co. 2000). I borrowed this quip from Justice Rice's dissent in State v. Griggs, 2001 MT
211, 57, 306 Mont. 366, 57, 34 P.3d 101, 57.
2. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 1.1(g) (3d ed. 1999).
3.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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that a crime has been or is currently being committed. If the
magistrate determines information in the warrant application is
sufficient to establish probable cause, he will issue the search
warrant. When a warrant is issued, the defendant may file a
4
motion to exclude the seized evidence for lack of probable cause.
The use of informant tips is a key element in the warrant
process. In the early era of informant jurisprudence, the U.S.
Supreme Court followed the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test.
Under this test, the Court required a search warrant affidavit
utilizing informant information to support both the informant's
5
veracity and basis of knowledge in establishing probable cause.
If the affidavit was insufficient to prove the informant's veracity
and basis of knowledge, further police corroboration of the
6
informant's tip was necessary.
In Illinois v. Gates, the U.S. Supreme rejected the twopronged test and adopted the "totality of the circumstances"
approach for determining probable cause. 7 Rejecting AguilarSpinelli's technical approach, the Court stated probable cause
determination should not be broken down into a "neat set of
legal rules."8 Montana adopted the Gates test in 1983 and has
since consistently applied the test. 9
In State v. Reesman,10 the Montana Supreme Court
examined the state's post-Gates jurisprudence, specifically the
use of informant tips. The court outlined some basic parameters
and situations in which probable cause is established and where
further police corroboration is required.
First, the court
determined that any anonymous tip used in establishing
probable cause must be corroborated by law enforcement.
Second, the court held that even if the informant is not
anonymous, if the informant did not personally observe the
alleged criminal activity, police corroboration is required. Third,
the court determined even in the instance of an identified
informant who witnessed the alleged criminal activity first-hand
the informant must be reliable1 1 to establish probable cause.
Facially, the parameters established in Reesman appear

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969).
462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Id. at 232.
State v. Kelly, 205 Mont. 417, 668 P.2d 1032 (1983).
2000 MT 243, 301 Mont. 408, 10 P.3d 83.
See infra Part III.C.1.
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contradictory to the Gates language-a recipe for mulligan stew.
The Montana Supreme Court, however, has further assured the
state's citizens protection against unreasonable searches by
instituting state constitutional safeguards. The decision gives
guidance to law enforcement, judicial magistrates, and prosecutors to determine the degree of weight given to an
informant's tip. Reesman merely takes some subjectivity out of
the totality of the circumstances.
The first section of this note examines the U.S. Supreme
Court's history of the use of informant tips for probable cause
determination.
The second section analyzes the recent
jurisprudence of the Montana Supreme Court, specifically, the
Court's application of the Montana State Constitution. The
third section explains the facts, holding, and reasoning of
Reesman. The fourth section addresses the police corroboration
requirements from State v. Griggs12 and the recent application of
Reesman. The fifth part examines the application of Gates in
the fifty states. The final section of the note presents two
hypothetical scenarios to analyze the practical consequences of
Reesman.
II. THE USE OF INFORMANT TIPS UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT

A. Hearsay and ProbableCause Tests Under the U.S. Supreme
Court
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the two-pronged test for
probable cause determination in Aguilar v. Texas 13 and Spinelli
v. United States.1 4 This test required the search warrant
affidavit to include facts about both the informant's veracity and
basis of knowledge.1 5 The basis of knowledge requirement refers
to the underlying factual circumstances of the informant's
conclusion of criminal activity. 16 In Aguilar, the Court noted
that although an informant need not have direct personal
observation of the alleged criminal activity, the magistrate must
be aware of some of the underlying circumstances in order to

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

2001 MT 211, 306 Mont. 366, 34 P.3d 101.
378 U.S. 108.
393 U.S. 410.
Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
Id.
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determine the credibility of the tip.17 The best way to satisfy the
basis of knowledge prong is to show that the informant based his
or her information on personal observation. 18
The veracity requirement refers to the credibility or
reliability of the informant on the particular occasion of the
alleged crime. 19 A mere conclusion that the informant is
credible is insufficient; reasons for believing the informant's
20
crediblity must be presented to the issuing magistrate.
The Spinelli Court affirmed the Aguilar holding and
supplemented the probable cause standard. The Court noted
that abundant detail may cure a deficiency in basis of
knowledge 21 and independent corroboration of details may cure
a deficiency in the informant's reliability. 22 The Court stated:
If the tip is found inadequate under Aguilar, the other allegations
which corroborate the information contained in the hearsay report
should then be considered. At this stage as well, however, the
standards enunciated in Aguilar must inform the magistrate's
decision. He must ask: Can it fairly be said that the tip, even when
certain parts of it have been corroborated by independent sources,
is as trustworthy as a tip which would pass Aguilar's tests without
independent corroboration? . . .A magistrate cannot be said to
have properly discharged his constitutional duty if he relies on an
informer's tip which-even when partially corroborated-is not as
reliable as one which passes Aguilar's requirements when
23
standing alone.

The Spinelli majority determined that a totality of the
circumstances approach for determining probable cause "paints
with too broad a brush" and "[w]here, as here, the informer's tip
is a necessary element in a finding of probable cause, its proper
weight must be determined by a more precise analysis."24
Fourteen years later, in Illinois v. Gates, the U.S. Supreme
Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test and
25
instead recommended a totality of circumstances analysis.

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 112.
21. 393 U.S. at 416.
22. Id. at 417.
23. Id. at 415-16.
24. Id. at 415.
25. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Initially, the parties were instructed to include the
good faith exception in their briefs. Id. at 217. The court decided not to address the good
faith exception here, however in United States v. Leon, just a few months later, the Court
upheld the good faith exception. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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According to the Court, the task of the issuing magistrate is
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision based on all
of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit including the
"veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay
information, that there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. The
Court stated veracity and reliability merely illuminate probable
cause, and a deficiency in one can be compensated by strength in
another. 26 The Court also noted that informant tips, like other
evidence, vary greatly in their value and reliability, and thus
27
rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity."
Under Gates, the issuing magistrate's determination of probable
cause is given greater discretion than under Aguilar-Spinelli.
In Gates, law enforcement received a letter from an
anonymous informant alleging the defendants were trafficking
drugs from Florida. The letter predicted Susan Gates would
drive to Florida on May 3rd. 28 Thereafter, Lance Gates would
fly to Florida and drive the car back to Illinois with a large
quantity of drugs. 29 The informant's letter lacked any indication
of how the informant knew about the Gates' illegal activities.
Law enforcement corroborated the tip and verified the predicted
activity from the letter. Law enforcement obtained a search
30
warrant and seized 350 pounds of marijuana.
The Illinois Supreme Court determined the two-pronged
test for probable cause had not been satisfied. The Court,
recognizing that law enforcement corroboration of the
informant's tip might cure a deficiency in the two-pronged test,
nevertheless held that the investigation only revealed innocent
activity. 31 Thus, the Court held that probable cause had not
been established.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court identified two major
flaws in the Aguilar-Spinelli framework. First, because courts
and commentators generally regarded the two prongs of the test
as independent of each other, courts had struggled to formulate
rules regarding what type of information and corroboration
might satisfy each of the prongs. 32 The second principal flaw in
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
Id. at 232 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972)).
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 228-30.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 229 n.4.
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the application of Aguilar-Spinelli was that the test had caused
reviewing courts, both at suppression hearings and on appeal, to
33
test the sufficiency of warrant affidavits by de novo review.
Such review, in the eyes of the Gates majority, was inconsistent
with the Constitution's "strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." 34 A reviewing court should
determine whether the magistrate issuing the warrant had a
"substantial basis" for concluding that a search would reveal
35
evidence of criminal activity.
The Gates Court gave other reasons for rejecting the two
prong test.
Sheriffs and police officers often draft search
warrants. A complex test requiring analytical and evidentiary
rules would be inappropriate for laymen.3 6 Aguilar-Spinelli,
when rigidly applied, could serve to discourage law enforcement
from pursuing search warrants and result in an increase in
warrantless searches. 37 Furthermore, the continued application
of the two-pronged test would virtually bar the use of
anonymous informants and hinder the government's protection
38
of its citizenry.
In his concurrence, Justice White argued that, although the
Aguilar-Spinelli test had often been applied too rigidly, it should
not be abandoned.3 9 In his view, the rules concerning police
corroboration were critical. White noted that the confirmation of
the predicted activity by the police gave rise to the inference
that the incriminating information given by the informant was
correct. 40 Thus, Justice White concluded that under the AguilarSpinelli test, the police corroboration in Gates was sufficient to
establish probable cause.
B. Recent Decisions under the Reasonable Suspicion StandardAlabama v. White 4 1 and Florida v. J.L.42
In Alabama v. White, the post-Gates U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the issue of anonymous informants to determine
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 236.
462 U.S. at 236.
Id.
Id. at 235-36.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 267.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 269. See also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
496 U.S. 325 (1990).
529 U.S. 266 (2000).
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reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is a lesser evidentiary standard than probable cause. 43 However, the same
issues of concern in determining probable cause, such as an
informant's veracity and basis of knowledge, are also relevant in
establishing reasonable suspicion. In White, law enforcement
received an anonymous tip that the defendant would be at the
Lynwood Terrace Apartments at a particular time in a brown
station wagon with a broken taillight. 44
The informant
predicted that White would drive to a particular motel. The
informant also stated White would be in possession of an ounce
of cocaine in a brown attache case. Law enforcement investigated the tip and confirmed the predicted activity. The police
pulled the woman over and, upon consent, searched the vehicle.
They seized marijuana and three milligrams of cocaine in a
45
brown attach6 bag.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that veracity,
reliability, and basis knowledge are relevant in the reasonable
suspicion context, although allowances must be made in
applying them for the lesser showing required to demonstrate
reasonable suspicion. 46 Even though the police corroboration in
this case was not as complete as it was in Gates, the
confirmation of the future behavior was sufficient to justify the
stop.47 The Court held that the anonymous tip, as corroborated
by independent police work, exhibited sufficient indicia of
reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make an
48
investigatory stop of the defendant's vehicle.
In Florida v. J.L., an officer received information from an
anonymous informant that there was a black man wearing a
plaid shirt at a bus stop who was in possession of a gun. 49 This
officer later spotted a man at a bus stop who matched that
description. The officers patted him down and found a gun.5 0
The Florida Supreme Court held the search invalid under the
Fourth Amendment because the anonymous tip lacked any

43. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (regarding probable cause
factors as also applicable in determining reasonable suspicion).
44. White, 496 U.S. at 327.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 328-29.
47. Id. at 332.
48. Id.
49. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
50. Id.
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indicia of reliability. 51 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
distinguished J.L. from White. In J.L., the anonymous tip
provided no predictive information and therefore left the police
without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility.5 2
The Court held that an anonymous tip lacking indicia of
53
reliability does not justify a stop and frisk.
Thus, a major focus in U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing
with anonymous tips is the confirmation of future activity. In
Gates, as in White, the case turned on the police confirmation of
the informant's prediction of criminal activity. In Florida v.
J.L., however, the anonymous tip lacked any prediction of
criminal action, and therefore verifying the informant's
reliability was impossible.

III. PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION IN MONTANA AND
APPLICATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION

Montana first adopted the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test
in State ex. rel. Townsend v. District Court.54 In State v. Kelly,
however, Montana adopted the "totality of circumstances" test
without officially overruling or abandoning the two-pronged
test. 55 In State v. Erler, the court held the search warrant valid
under the Aguilar test and therefore did not apply the "less
stringent" Gates test.56 In State v. O'Neill, the court borrowed
more language from Gates, referring to its totality of
circumstances test 57 and the appellate review in probable cause
cases; the language of Aguilar was less apparent in ONeill.58 In
State v. Hendrickson, the Court finally officially abandoned
Aguilar, echoing the United States Supreme Court's holding,
that it was "wiser to abandon the two-pronged test" and apply
the totality of the circumstances test. 59 Notably, however, the
court never examined the Gates test under the Montana State
Constitution.
In the mid-1980's, the Montana Supreme Court first applied
51. J.L. v. Florida, 727 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1998).
52. J.L., 529 U.S. at 274.
53. Id.
54. 168 Mont. 357, 361, 543 P.2d 193, 195 (1975).
55. 205 Mont. 417, 668 P.2d 1032 (1983).
56. 207 Mont. 88, 94, 672 P.2d, 624, 628 (1983).
57. 208 Mont. 386, 394, 679 P.2d 760, 764 (1984).
58. O'Neill, 208 Mont. at 396, 679 P.2d at 765. It should also be noted that the Court
continues to cite to Aguilar on this same issue.
59. 217 Mont. 1, 4, 701 P.2d 1368, 1370 (1985).
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the state constitution independent of the federal model. In Butte
Community Union v. Lewis the court noted: "We will not be
bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court where
independent state grounds exist for developing heightened and
expanded rights under our state constitution."60 In State v.
Sierra,the court wrote:
[a]s long as we guarantee the minimum rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution, we are not compelled to march lockstep with pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court if
our own constitutional provisions call for more individual rights
protection than that guaranteed by the United States Con61
stitution.

Shortly thereafter the court interpreted the state
constitution as giving citizens broader protection than the Fifth
62
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Recently the Montana Supreme Court has applied both the
state's constitutional privacy provision 63 and the state's
constitutional search and seizure provision 64 to give Montanans
broader protection than the federal counterpart. In State v.
Bullock, the court held that the right to privacy disallows federal
"open fields" search as an exception to the warrant requirement. 65 The court asserted that: "states are free to grant
citizens greater protections based on state constitutional
provisions than the United States Supreme Court divines from
the United States Constitution." 66 In State v.Hardaway, the
Montana Supreme Court held that the right to privacy disallows
swabbing blood samples from hands of an arrestee as a
warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. 67 The right to
60. 219 Mont. 426, 433, 712 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1986).
61. 214 Mont. 472, 476, 692 P.2d 1273, 1276 (1985), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Pastos, 269 Mont. 43, 887 P.2d 199 (1994).
62. State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986).
63. MONT CONST. art II, § 10. The provision reads: "Right to Privacy. The right of
individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be
infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest."
64. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11. The provision reads:
Searches and Seizures. The people shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to
search any place, or seize any person or thing shall issue without describing
the place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized, or without probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing.
65. 272 Mont. 361, 384, 901 P.2d 61, 75-76 (1995).
66. Bullock, 272 Mont. at 383, 901 P.2d at 75 (citing State v. Sawyer, 174 Mont. 512,
515, 571 P.2d 1131, 1133 (1977), overruled on other grounds by State v. Long, 216 Mont.
65, 700 P.2d 153 (1985)).
67. 2001 MT 252, 58, 307 Mont. 139, 58, 36 P.3d 900, 58.
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privacy also negated the federal automobile exception to the
warrant requirement. 68 The right to privacy has also been
69
applied in other areas of law as well.
Although the Montana Supreme Court has begun to breathe
life into article II, section 10, it has not been willing to overturn
the adoption of the Gates. Washington, which Montana has
70
previously looked to in interpreting article II, section 10,
rejected Gates under its own hybred search and sezure/privacy
provision.7 1 Three other states have also chosen to continue to
follow Aguilar-Spinelli because of broader state constitutional
protection.7 2 Montana has referred to its own privacy provision
as the "cornerstone of protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures." 73 This protection, however, has yet to extend to
the Aguilar-Spinelli mandate.
IV. STATE V. REESMAN

A. The Facts
On November 28, 1995, Detective Don Hansen received
information from a confidential informant who had allegedly
witnessed a variety of drug activity at a trailer home in Big Sky,
Montana.7 4 The confidential informant stated that a person
named "Brent Hoge," or "Beau Dylan Hogge," had shown the
informant live marijuana plants, drying marijuana buds and

68. State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, 46, 302 Mont. 228, 46, 14 P.3d 456, 46.
69. See e.g. State v. Nelson, 283 Mont. 231, 941 P.2d 441 (1997) (The right to privacy
disallows unauthorized access to personal medical records without a subpoena); Gryczan
v. State, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997) (The right of consenting adults to engage in
private, non-commercial sexual conduct strikes at the very core of Montana's
constitutional right of individual privacy; and, absent an interest more compelling than a
legislative distaste of what is perceived to be offensive and immoral sexual practices on
the part of homosexuals, state regulation, much less criminalization, of this most
intimate social relationship will not withstand constitutional scrutiny).
70. The Montana Supreme Court has previously cited to the application of
Washington's state constitution to at least partially justify its departure from the Fourth
Amendment. See State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 275, 934 P.2d 175, 191 (1997) (citing
State v. Young, 879 P.2d 593 (Wash. 2d 1994)), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Kuneff, 1998 MT 287, 291 Mont. 474, 970 P.2d 556; Bullock, 272 Mont. 361, 382, 901
P.3d 61, 74 (1995) (citing State v. Johnson, 879 P.2d 984 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994)).
71. State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 143 (Wash. 1984)
72. See Supra, note 157.
73. State v. Solis, 214 Mont. 310, 319, 693 P.2d 518, 522-23 (1984).
74. State v. Reesman, 2000 MT 243, IT 6-7, 301 Mont. 408, 7 6-7, 10 P.3d 83, 77 6-
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75
illegal mushroom spores during the weekend of October 28th.
The warrant application provided no testimony concerning the
76
informant's past reliability.
The warrant application also stated that an anonymous
informant contacted Detective Hansen about the same residence. According to the warrant application, this anonymous
citizen, who had supposedly given reliable information in the
past, told Hansen that marijuana had been growing at this
residence for over a year. 77 Hansen's warrant application,
however, was silent about the anonymous informant's basis of
78
knowledge.
On November 30, 1995, Hansen requested and obtained a
search warrant for the trailer located in Big Sky. 79 That same
day Hansen searched the trailer and seized more than one
hundred hits of LSD.8 0 On July 12, 1996, the State charged
Reesman with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with
intent to sell and criminal possession of drug paraphernalia.,'
On May 22, 1998, nearly two and half years after the
82
search, Reesman moved to suppress the drug evidence.
Reesman argued the search of the entire trailer was overbroad
and that the search warrant lacked probable cause.8 3 In July of
1998, the district court denied Reesman's motion, reasoning the
corroboration of the confidential informant's tip by the
anonymous informant weighed heavily in favor of the
confidential informant's reliability and was sufficient to
84
establish probable cause.

B. Holding
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court,
holding the search warrant insufficient to establish probable
cause. The confidential informant's report, which contained
detailed information concerning the informant's basis of
knowledge, nevertheless lacked any testimony concerning her
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id., 7.
Id., 6, 18.
Id., 8.
Id.
Reesman, 10.
Id., 12.
Appellant's Brief at 1, Reesman (No. 99-142).
Reesman, 2000 MT 243 at 13, 301 Mont. 408 at
Id.
10.

84.

Id.

13, 10 P.3d 83 at

13.

15.
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veracity or reliability and therefore police corroboration of the
tip was required.
The state's attempt to corroborate the
confidential informant tip with the anonymous informant's tip
failed; a source of information that requires further corroboration cannot meet that requirement by a source which also
requires further corroboration. 8 5 Accordingly, the court held
that the search warrant lacked probable cause and the district
court had erred in denying Reesman's motion to suppress.
C. Reasoning
1.

The Majority Opinion

Essentially, the issue before the court boiled down to
whether the anonymous informant's tip, combined with the
information from the confidential informant, was sufficient to
establish probable cause. Montana Code Annotated Section 465-221, which codifies state constitutional search and seizure
protection, requires an application for a search warrant to
contain facts sufficient to show probable cause for the issuance
of the warrant.
The court followed the Gates totality of
circumstances test. According to the Gates test, a magistrate
must look within the four corners of a search warrant and a
make a practical, common-sense decision to determine whether
a crime has been committed and whether there is a fair
86
probability that in-criminating items will be found.
Noting that the Gates test rejects "any rigid demand that
specific tests be satisfied by every informant's tip," the majority
determined that seventeen years of post-Gates precedent
established a "fairly uniform equation for determining whether
an informant's statements, without further law enforcement
corroboration or investigation, are sufficient to establish
87
probable cause."
The first part of the majority's equation focused on the
anonymous informant.
A Crimestopper's tip is a common
example of information provided by an anonymous informant.
Echoing its decision in State v. Rinehart, the court noted that
"corroboration of an informant's information through other
sources is necessary when the information is hearsay or the

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.

46-47.
24.
27.
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informant is anonymous."88 According to the court, an issuing
magistrate has no way to determine the veracity or reliability of
an anonymous informant tip and therefore additional police
corroboration of an anonymous tip is mandatory to establish
probable cause.
The court next focused on personal observation. If the
informant is not anonymous, a second threshold question arises:
is the informant's information based on first-hand personal
observation? If the answer is no, further police corroboration is
always required.8 9 The court cited to Rinehart, noting "an
informant's personal observation of criminal activity does not
constitute hearsay evidence." 90 In State v. Kaluza, the court
concluded that the lack of reference to personal observation or
personal knowledge of an informant's information made the tip
worthless. 9 1 Finally, in State v. Wilson, the court found that the
informant's "bare assertion" of personal observation of
marijuana growing in defendant's home was deficient because of
lack of specificity in describing the interior of the house and the
92
location of the growing operation.
The court's third threshold question concerned informant
reliability. The court created three levels of reliability for
analysis purposes: 1) the confidential informant (C.I.); 2) the
admission against interest; and 3) the concerned citizen. For the
C.I. to be deemed reliable, the informant must have provided
reliable and accurate information in the past. 93 An affirmation
by the applying law enforcement officer that the C.I. has
provided reliable information in the past is sufficient to satisfy
this qualification. The court cited to Kaluza, in which a sworn
statement by a law officer that an informant had been
previously reliable and provided accurate information was
sufficient to deem the informant reliable. 94 The court also cited
to State v. Walston, noting that "information of a criminal
activity known from observation by a previously reliable
informant... is sufficient to establish the probability of criminal

88. Reesman, 2000 MT 243 at 28, 301 Mont. 408 at 28, 10 P.3d 83 at T 28 (citing
Rinehart, 262 Mont. 204, 211-12, 864 P.2d 1219, 1223-24 (1993)).
89. Id. 7 29-30.
90. Id. 29 (citing Rinehart, 262 Mont. at 212, 864 P.2d at 1224).
91. Id. (citing State v. Kaluza, 272 Mont. 404, 411, 901 P.2d 107, 111 (1995)).
92. Id. (citing State v. Wilson, 254 Mont. 317, 319, 837 P.2d 1346, 1347 (1992)).
93. Id.
32.
94. Reesman, 2000 MT 243 at 7 32, 301 Mont. 408 at 32, 10 P.3d 83 at 32 (citing
Kaluza, 272 Mont. at 410, 901 P.2d at 111).
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activity without investigation and verification of the reported
information." 95 Thus, corroboration of a C.I.'s tip is not required
when an affirmation of past reliability is given.
A second scenario examined was the admission against
interest. An admission against interest generally establishes
reliability and thus requires no further corroboration by law
enforcement. 96 In State v. Adams, the court held that an
admission of participation in a marijuana growing operation,
without any further corroboration, was sufficient to provide a
97
basis for probable cause determination.
The court's third common scenario concerned reports
motivated by "good citizenship. '98 Generally, the reporting of
incriminating information motivated by good citizenship is
deemed reliable. 99 The underlying circumstances of the report
itself tend to determine whether the report is motivated by good
citizenship. 10 0 The court cited State v. Valley, in which it had
concluded that although a citizen informant is presumed
reliable, this is not a per se presumption. 10 1
Applying these parameters to the scenario in Reesman, the
court first determined that the confidential informant's report
satisfied the first two threshold questions; the informant was
not anonymous and the informant's knowledge was based on
first-hand personal observation. The lack of any indication of
the C.I.'s reliability, however, made further police corroboration
mandatory in this case.
The final section of the court's decision focused on the
quantity and quality of police corroboration required when the
tip alone does not establish probable cause. The State argued
corroboration of the confidential informant's tip by the
anonymous informant was sufficient to establish probable cause.
The court began its analysis stating: "as an underlying general
rule, further independent corroboration or investigation by law
enforcement personnel is the panacea for most warrant
95. Id. (citing State v. Walston, 236 Mont. 218, 223, 768 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1989)).
96. Id. 33.
97. Id. (citing State v. Adams, 284 Mont. 25, 37, 943 P.2d 955, 962 (1997)
("admissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own
indicia of credibility-sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search")
(quoting United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971))).
98. Id. 34.
99. Id.
100. Reesman, 2000 MT 243 at 34, 301 Mont. 408 at 34, 10 P.3d 83 at 34.
101. 252 Mont. 489, 493, 830 P.2d 1255, 1258 (1992) (citing State v. Niehaus, 452
N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 1990)).
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applications where information is supplied by an informant." 10 2
The majority cited several Montana cases involving action taken
by law enforcement to corroborate the tips given by the
informants. 10 3 Furthermore, the court adopted language from
Gates stating the value of "corroboration of details of an
informant's tip by independent police work establish[es]
'substantial basis for crediting the hearsay."' 10 4
Applying the law to the facts of this case, the Montana
Supreme Court held that the tip from the anonymous informant
"provides no indicia of reliability of a citizen informant in terms
of personal observation, or the circumstances under which the
person made his or her personal observations."'1 5 Thus, the
anonymous tip added nothing to the warrant as a whole and
therefore, probable cause was not established.
2.

The Concurringand Dissenting Opinions

Not all of the Justices on the court were willing to adopt the
full majority opinion. Justice Regnier's concurrence focused on
the police corroboration requirements. Justice Regnier argued
the court's conclusion, that corroboration must be accomplished
through "police investigation," was too restrictive. 10 6 Justice
Regnier also advised law enforcement:
A sufficient warrant application should always detail both how the
officer acquired the information giving rise to probable cause, and,
if the officer is relying on an informant, how the informant
acquired his or her knowledge and circumstances which
would indicate that the informant's report is worth crediting. For
instance, as noted by the majority, Detective Hanson could have
indicated how the confidential informant happened to be in the
trailer home and this may have provided the judge with grounds
07
for crediting the veracity of the confidential informant's report. 1

Justice Regnier still found the information given in the
warrant too conclusive and insufficient to establish probable
08
cause.
In an opinion somewhat analogous to a reply brief, Justice

102.

Reesman, 2000 MT 243 at

43, 301 Mont. 408 at

103. Id.

45.

104.

44 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 241-42).

Id.

105. Id.

43, 10 P.3d 83 at

43.

47.

106. Id.
49. According to Justice Regnier, the Court's conclusion that corroboration
must be accomplished through "police investigation" is too restrictive. Id.

107. Id.
108.

66.

Reesman, 2000 MT 243 at

67, 301 Mont. 408 at

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2004

67, 10 P.3d 83 at

67.

15

Vol. 65

MONTANA
REVIEW
Montana Law
Review, Vol.LAW
65 [2004],
Iss. 1, Art. 6

Nelson dissented, in part, to the majority opinion he authored.
Justice Nelson was well-prepared to reply to his concurring
justices. He asked: "what other kind of corroboration exists,
besides corroboration by police investigation?'10 9 Justice Nelson
noted the concurring justices failed to provide any other
examples of corroboration.
V. POST-REESMAN DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Indicia of CriminalActivity-State v. Griggs

In Reesman, the court established a formula for determining
whether an informant's report is sufficient to establish probable
cause. A question remained, however, as to what amount of
corroboration is required to establish probable cause when the
informant's tip alone is insufficient. State v. Griggs addressed
the corroboration requirements for informant tips that alone
could not fulfill the requirements for probable cause. 110 In
Griggs, the Gallatin County Sheriffs Department received an
anonymous informant's tip reporting an operation for growing
illegal hallucinogenic mushrooms.11 1 The anonymous informant
stated he had witnessed the operation first-hand one month
earlier.1 12 The anonymous informant also gave a description of
the residence, the make of a truck, and the name of the alleged
criminal. The sheriffs department confirmed parts of the tip by
driving by the residence and checking the name Griggs in the
phonebook. 113 The magistrate issued a warrant for a search of
the residence and the police seized illegal drugs. 114 Griggs filed
a motion to exclude the seized evidence for lack of probable
cause.' 1 5
The district court determined the corroboration,
merely verifying the innocent details of Griggs' truck and
116
residence did not meet probable cause requirements.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's decision. The Court determined that sufficient corroboration must consist of more than merely innocent public
109. Id.
110.
111.
112.

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116.

70.

2001 MT 211, 306 Mont. 366, 34 P.3d 101.
Griggs, 2001 MT 211 at 9 6, 8, 306 Mont. 366 at 99 6, 8, 34 P.3d 101 at 99 6, 8.
Id.

7.
13
15

Griggs, 2001 MT 211 at

15, 306 Mont. 366 at
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information. 117 Law enforcement corroboration of an anonymous
tip, required under the Reesman paradigm, must reveal indicia
of human conduct, which becomes suspicious in conjunction with
the incriminating information in the anonymous tip.118 "The
necessary indicia of suspicion resulting from police corroboration
of otherwise innocent information must reveal a pattern of
human behavior associated with the alleged criminal activity, or
activities which, when viewed as a whole, are consistent with
the alleged criminal activity."11 9
Justice Rice, who was not on the court for the Reesman
decision, expressed his displeasure with the holding in Griggs.
In his concurrence Rice cited to Gates, stating although he
admitted that the Reesman framework was helpful in determining probable cause, he felt that the decision was too far a
divergence from Gates.120 "[P]robable cause is a fluid conceptturning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules. By definition, there cannot be a precise recipe for
121
Mulligan Stew."
B. Sufficient Corroboration? State v. Gray 122 and Hauge v.
Dist. Court 23
The court first applied Reesman and Griggs in State v. Gray,
emphasizing the indicia of suspicion requirement.1 24 In Gray,
the court found the innocuous details of the defendant's name
and description insufficient for adequate corroboration. 125
However, the search warrant also listed other facts, including 1)
a criminal history of drug convictions; 2) "known drug user"
traffic at the residence; and 3) inordinately high power
consumption at the residence. 126 The court determined the facts
1 27
taken as a whole were sufficient to establish probable cause.
In Hauge v. Dist. Court, the court emphasized that innocent
117.

Id. T 50.

118.

Id.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Griggs, 2001 MT 211 at 46, 306 Mont. 366 at 46, 34 P.3d 101 at T 46.
Id. TT 57-58.
Id. 57.
2001 MT 250, 307 Mont. 124, 38 P.3d 775.
2001 MT 255, 307 Mont. 195, 36 P.3d 947.
Gray, 2001 MT 250 at $T 13-21, 307 Mont. 124 at
13-21, 38 P.3d at
13-21.
Id. 20.
Id. 921.
Id.
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details of the informant's tip must raise an issue of criminal
activity in order to provide adequate police corroboration. 128 The
Hauge Court concluded the officer adequately corroborated the
tip by viewing the house on three separate occasions. 129 The
officer's observations revealed a pattern of short-term visits to
residences by known drug users. The officer also contacted a
neighbor who had complained of drug activity and high traffic
patterns. 130
The "indicia of criminal activity" rule from Griggs, as
applied in Gray and Hauge is not overly restrictive. Both cases
considered a combination of facts raising an indication of
criminal activity. Although the scope of the Griggs rule was not
clearly defined in Gray or Hauge, basic contours and parameters
have developed. The Griggs Court suggested that facts such as
prior convictions related to the alleged criminal activity, would
13 1
be sufficient to fulfill the police corroboration requirement.
Facts indicating the existence of drug activity such as "traffic"
and supplies or cultivation information are also highly
relevant. 132 Nevertheless, hearsay, which is not specifically
related to alleged criminal activity, is irrelevant.133
One could argue that in Montana the "common sense
practical" language echoed in Gates now applies to the
magistrate's decision on the sufficiency of the police corroboration.
If law enforcement's investigation uncovers an
indication of criminal activity, an informant's lack of prior
reliability or first-hand basis of knowledge may not matter.
On the one hand, the court has protected Montana citizens'
individual rights by enunciating the minimum requirements to
establish probable cause. By the same token, the court has also
handicapped law enforcement by greatly diminishing the weight
given to an anonymous informant's tip. Nevertheless, the gray
area for probable cause determination is narrowed. The next
question though, is whether police investigation that uncovers
slight indicia of suspicion would be sufficient police corroboration.

128.
24-25.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Hauge, 2001 MT 255 at IT 24-25, 307 Mont. 195 at
Id.
Id.
Griggs, 2001 MT 211 at
Id.
Id. 41.

51, 306 Mont. 366 at
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The Citizen Informant-State v. Martinez 134 and State v.
Olson135

Many of the same criteria for determining probable cause
are also used for determining reasonable or particularized
suspicion. 136 In Martinez, the Montana Supreme Court shed
some light on the area of citizen informants. According to the
court, factors such as prior convictions and unclear motivations
can affect the status of an informant in determining whether to
137
classify the informant as citizen or as confidential informant.
This in turn will affect the deference of reliability given to the
informant.
In Martinez, the court concluded that the motivation for an
informant's report was questionable because of her prior
criminal convictions. In light of the informant's questionable
motivation, her reliability too was questionable, and as such,
further police corroboration of the informant's tip was necessary
1 38
to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
The Montana Supreme Court also dealt with the citizen
informant in State v. Olson. In Olson, Mike Smith contacted law
enforcement regarding a possible methamphetamine operation
on his wife's property in Great Falls. 139 Smith stated that while
he was retrieving items from his wife's garage he had observed
tubing, mason jars, and coffee filters connected together, along
with the smell of anhydrous ammonia. 140 He also alleged that
he spoken with a man in the garage who asked him "to keep this
cool, now, right?" 141 Law enforcement observed the residence
and observed people moving items from the garage and into a
vehicle. Police subsequently stopped a vehicle, which was registered to Sharon Olson, and Olson admitted that methamphetamine equipment was in her car.1 42 The police obtained
a search warrant and seized equipment used to manufacture
methamphetamine. Olson filed a motion to exclude the seized
134. 2003 MT 65, 314 Mont. 434, 67 P.3d. 207.
135. 2003 MT 61, 314 Mont. 402, 66 P.3d. 297.
136. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (regarding probable cause
factors as also applicable in determining reasonable suspicion).
137. Martinez, 2003 MT 65 at 34-35, 314 Mont. 434 at 34-35, 67 P.3d 207 at 3435.
138. Id.
56-58.
139. Olson, 2003 MT 61 at 6, 314 Mont. 402 at 6, 66 P.3d 297 at 6.
140.

Id.

141.
142.

Id.
Olson, 2003 MT 61 at

8, 314 Mont. 402 at

8, 66 P.3d 297 at
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evidence, which the district court denied.143
On appeal, Olson argued that the search warrant for her
vehicle lacked probable cause. The Montana Supreme Court
applied the Reesman test to determine whether the informant's
tip was sufficient to establish probable cause. 144 Since the
informant was not anonymous and witnessed the alleged
criminal activity first-hand,. the only issue was whether the
informant could be deemed reliable.
The district court
determined that the informant had immediately reported the
alleged criminal activity and therefore qualified as a "concerned
citizen, motivated by 'good citizenship. ' 145 The Supreme Court
upheld the district court's conclusion, noting that although there
was evidence of a strained relationship between the informant
and his wife, it was not sufficient to overcome the presumption
that he acted as a good citizen.146
147
The concerned citizen concept still appears to be evolving,
but Martinez and Olson identify relevant factors. In Martinez,
the court focused on the informant's prior criminal conviction
and concluded the informant's motivation was questionable.
Olson focused on the timeliness of the informant's report.
Although there were reasons to question the informant's
motivation, the fact that he contacted law enforcement
immediately after he witnessed the drug operation was
sufficient to deem him reliable.
VI. THE APPLICATION OF GATES IN STATE COURTS

An intriguing phenomenon occurs in law in that nearly
identical factual scenarios can result in opposite results. Many
state courts will take different approaches to the same issue,
applying or disregarding various legal doctrines, and thus
reaching different results. A good example of this is the states'
application of the Fourth Amendment's prophylactic remedy of
the exclusionary rule. The United States Supreme Court in
Mapp v. Ohio held the exclusionary rule, which excludes

143. Id.
9-10.
144. Id.
25-27.
145. Id. 1 27.
146. Id.
147. The Montana Supreme Court adopted the "concerned citizen" from the Iowa
Supreme Court in 1992. State v. Valley, 252 Mont. 489, 493 (1992) (citing State v.
Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 1990)).
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illegally seized evidence, applies to the states. 148 Although the
states must recognize the exclusionary rule, each state is free to
interpret its own constitution, statutes, and common law to
guide it in determining whether to afford its citizens broader
protections than the U.S. Constitution. 14 9 Because of this
federalism dichotomy, the courts of each individual jurisdiction
can choose which exceptions to the exclusionary rule to apply.
Unconstitutionally seized evidence, which will be excluded in
jurisdiction A, (because it chose not to recognize the "good
faith"150 exception), may well be admissible in jurisdiction B.
151
The effects of the exclusionary remedy can be tremendous.
State constitutional provisions, statutes, and common law
allow state courts to determine whether to follow the minimum
requirement for constitutional rights tests developed by the U.S.
Supreme Court or to afford their citizens more protection. The
Fourth Amendment provides the minimum requirements for
establishing probable cause for search and seizure. Some state
constitutions, however, provide greater protection than the
Fourth Amendment. Moreover, a state court case decided under
the state's own constitution is not subject to judicial review by
15 2
the United States Supreme Court.
Forty-two states have adopted the Gates test.153 Many of

148. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
149. See Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (citing Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 62 (1967) and Sibron v. N.Y., 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968)).
150. See U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
151. See Raymond A. Atkins, Paul H. Rubin, Effect of Criminal Procedure On Crime
Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46 J.L. & ECON. 157
(2003).
152. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Montana Supreme Court in
Montana v.Egelhoff. 518 U.S. 37 (1996). In Egelhoff, the Montana Supreme Court held
that there was an intoxication defense under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 41. The
U.S. Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment provided no intoxication defense.
Id. at 56. If, however, the Montana Supreme Court had held the decision under the
Montana State Constitution, it would not have faced federal judicial review.
153. See Hyde v. State 534 So. 2d 1132 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Torres, 704
P.2d 1347, 1348 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Thompson v. State, 658 S.W.2d 350 (Ark. 1983);
People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904 (Colo. 1986); State v. Barton, 594 A.2d 917 (Conn.
1991); State v. Stephens, 311 S.E.2d 823 (Ga. 1984); State v. Lang, 672 P.2d 561 (Idaho
1983); People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147 (Ill. 1984); Haller v. State 454 N.E.2d 76 (Ind.Ct.
App. 1983); State v. Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1990); State v. Toler, 787 P.2d 711
(Kan. 1990); Brown v. Commonwealth, 711 S.W.2d 488 (Ky. 1986); State v. Robertson,
721 So. 2d 1268 (La. 1998); State v. Knowlton, 489 A.2d 529 (Me. 1985); McDonald v.
State, 701 A.2d 675 (Md. 1997); People v. Faucet, 499 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Mich. 1993);
State v. Willey, 366 N.W.2d 265 (Minn. 1985); Sims v. State, 512 So. 2d 1256 (Miss.
1987); State v. Jackson, 658 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Detweiler, 544
N.W.2d 83 (Neb. 1986); Keesee v. State, 879 P.2d 63 (Nev. 1994); State v. Carroll, 552
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these states borrowed the language directly from Gates and set
it into precedent. Scholars have argued that a second layer of
constitutional rights via the states is necessary to protect the
citizenry. 154 Some states choose only one layer. Florida's state
constitutional search and seizure provision requires the state's
courts to follow lock-step the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 155 Florida's approach
provides a legal certainty to the interpretation of state's search
and seizure provision, but affords no added protection beyond
the Fourth Amendment.
Eight of the fifty states continue to apply the two-pronged
Aguilar-Spinelli test. 156 Of the eight, Alaska, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, Tennessee, and Washington
continue to apply Aguilar-Spinelli under broader state constitutional provisions.1 57 Of those seven states, Alaska, Massachusetts, and Washington have rejected the Gates test under
under broader state constitutional privacy rights. Hawaii's
privacy provision requires de novo appellette review of all
probable cause determinations. 158 Oregon has codified the two59
pronged test into state law.
In State v. Jones, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that
the Gates approach failed to provide adequate protection under

A.2d 69 (N.H. 1988); State v. Zutic, 713 A.2d 1043, 1047 (N.J. 1998); State v. Arrington,
319 S.E.2d 254 (N.C. 1984); State v. Rydberg, 519 N.W.2d 306 (N.D. 1994) State v.
George, 544 N.E.2d 640 (Ohio 1989); Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985);
State v. Girard, 799 A.2d 238 (R.I. 2002); State v. Jones, 536 S.E.2d 675 (S.C. 2000);
State v. Jackson 616 N.W.2d 412 (S.D. 2000); Hennessy v. State, 660 S.W.2d 87 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983); State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985); State v. Langlois, 667
A.2d 46, 47 (Vt. 1995); State v. Adkins, 346 S.E.2d 762 (W. Va. 1986).
154. See Jodi Levine Avergun, The Impact of Illinois v. Gates: The States Consider the
Totality of the CircumstancesTest, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1127 (1987).
155. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1982) ("This right shall be construed in conformity
with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court.").
156. See Ivanoff v. State, 9 3d. 294 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000); State v. Detroy, 76 P.3d
485, 490 (Haw. 2003); Commonwealth v. O'Day, 798 N.E.2d 275 (Mass. 2003); State v.
Cordova, 784 P.2d 30 (N.M. 1989); People v. Difalco, 610 N.E.2d 352, 353 (N.Y. 1993);
State v. Coffey, 788 P.2d 424, 426 (Or. 1990); State v. Stevens, 989 S.W.2d 290, 293-94
(Tenn. 1999); State v. Vickers, 59 P.3d 58 (Wash. 2002).
157. See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985); State v. Ward, 617 P.2d 568, 570
(Haw. 1980); Commonwealth v. Burt, 473 N.E.2d 683, 688-89 (Mass. 1985); State v.
Cordova, 784 P.2d 30, 36 (N.M. 1989); People v. Johnson 488 N.E.2d 439, 445 (N.Y. 1985);
State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136
(Wash. 1984).
158. State v. Navas, 913 P.2d. 39 (Haw. 1996)
159. OR. REV. STAT. § 133.545 (2001).
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the state constitution search and seizure provision. 160 According
to the Jones Court, diverging from the federal model was
justified under the broader protection afforded to 161Alaska's
citizens via the state's constitutional privacy provision.
In State v. Jackson, the Washington Supreme Court considered whether to adopt the Gates test. 162 The Jackson Court
focused on whether the Gates test provided adequate protection
to the state's citizens under article I, section 7 of the Washington
State Constitution.1 63 It found many of the reasons the U.S.
Supreme Court offered in abandoning the two-prong test
The Jackson Court concluded Gates "lacks
unpersuasive.
sufficient specificity and analytical structure to adequately
inform magistrates as to the appropriate standards required to
protect the right of privacy secured by Const. Art 1, § 7."164
Other states have wavered in determining whether to adopt
Gates. For example, in State v. Kimbro, the Connecticut Supreme Court originally rejected Gates.1 65 Six years later in State
Similarly, the
v. Barton, the court overruled Kimbro.166
Gates under
rejected
originally
Court
also
Oklahoma Supreme
the state constitution and then overruled itself two years
later. 167
Even though most state courts adhere to Gates, the
application of the test can vary. The test is subjective in form
and state courts can reach different results on substantially
similar facts. Although basis of knowledge, veracity, and police
corroboration are all highly relevant factors in the probable
cause analysis, different states may give varying weight to each
of these factors. Compare the fact pattern in Griggs with the
similar facts of State v. Berry.168 In Berry, an anonymous
informant reported that the defendants, a married couple, were

160. 706 P.2d 317, 324 (Alaska 1985).
161. Id.
162. 688 P.2d 136 (Wash. 1984).
163. The provision reads: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, his home
invaded, without authority of law." This provision adopts elements of both privacy and
search and seizure.
164. Jackson, 688 P.2d at 143.
165. 496 A.2d 498, 507 (Conn. 1985).
166. 594 A.2d 917, 926-27 (Conn. 1991).
167. Originally the Oklahoma Criminal Appellate Court determined the state
constitution mandated the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Merry v. State, 766 P.2d 1377, 1379
(Okla. Crim. App. 1988). Two years later the Court held that the Gates test was more
"practical." Langham v. State, 787 P.2d 1279, 1280-81 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990).
168. 801 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1990).
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in possession of illegal drugs. 169 The tip also gave non-criminal
facts about the Berrys, such as a description of their home,
automobile, and items on the property. The deputy was able to
corroborate all of the non-criminal facts and obtained a search
warrant. The Missouri Supreme Court (en banc) upheld the
magistrate's probable cause determination. The Berry Court
focused on the anonymous caller's first hand observation of the
marijuana, which established a strong basis of knowledge.
Based on the strong basis of knowledge and the corroborative
efforts of the law enforcement, which helped confirm the
informant's veracity, the Missouri Supreme Court held a
magistrate could make a practical common sense decision that
170
probable cause existed.
Although both Montana and Missouri follow the Gates test,
the Missouri Supreme Court took a different approach to
probable cause determination. In Berry, strong weight was
given to the anonymous informant's basis of knowledge. The
Reesman requirements, however, made the anonymous
informant's firsthand observation in Griggs meaningless. The
lack of veracity of an anonymous informant's tip was dispositive
and basis of knowledge was not considered.
The Missouri
Supreme Court was not constrained by Reesman's technical
rules for determining probable cause.
VII. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS

In this section I present two hypothetical scenarios in an
attempt to analyze the application of the Reesman paradigm, as
well as the police corroboration requirements from Griggs. Each
scenario examines the likelihood of a probable cause determination. I realize many criminal investigations are complex
and involve a large number of facts. The facts in these scenarios
are simplified merely to demonstrate the test's application.
Assume that all of the following facts are true, sworn to, and
listed in the search warrant affidavit.' 71
Scenario 1: Confidential Informant 10-9000 reports to local law
enforcement that John Doe at 350 Red Deer Road in Shelby, MT is
selling methamphetamines out of his house. The informant de169. Id. at 64.
170. Id. at 67.
171. For the sake of the reader (and the author), sub-facial warrant challenges will not
be addressed. For an excellent examination of this issue in Montana, see Peter William
Mickelson, Good Riddance to Good Faith?: Deciphering Montana's New Text for
Subfacial Challenges to Search WarrantAffidavits, 62 MONT. L. REV. 175 (2001).
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scribes to the officers the exterior of the residence and the vehicles
at the residence.
The search warrant affidavit states the
informant witnessed the sale of drugs first-hand. It also states
that the informant has provided reliable information in the past.
Local law enforcement found the name "John Doe" in the
phonebook and his residence matched the address given by the
informant.
The officer is unable to determine any criminal
activity by Mr. Doe in the past. The officer then drives by the
residence and confirms the description of the residence given by
the informant.

In this scenario, a magistrate would most likely determine
that there is sufficient evidence to support a probable cause
determination. Here, the informant is not anonymous, so we
can proceed to the second part of the Reesman paradigm. The
affidavit states that the informant witnessed the alleged
criminal first-hand. This satisfies the second part of Reesman.
Finally, for law enforcement to use the tip for probable cause, in
and of itself, the informant must be deemed reliable. Under
Reesman, a confidential informant is deemed reliable if "he or
she [has] provided reliable and accurate information to officers
in the past. ..,172
A sworn statement by a law enforcement

officer is sufficient to determine reliability. 173 In this scenario
the informant satisfies all three requirements under Reesman.
Although law enforcement takes investigative measures to
corroborate the tip, these measures appear to be unnecessary.
A critical variable is the deemed reliability of the informant.
Under Reesman, law enforcement's sworn statement that the
informant has provided reliable and accurate information in the
past is sufficient to find informant reliability. 174 This standard,
however, should be more clearly defined. For example, what if
the informant had provided accurate information on two prior
occasions, but had provided false information in three other
instances? Or what if the previously reliable information was
information that was of innocent activity, and thus easily
attainable? Perhaps a more reasonable standard to deem the
confidential informant reliable would require the confidential
informant's previous tip(s) to have led to criminal conviction(s).1 75
Another possibility would require the search

172. Reesman, 2000 MT 243 at 32, 301 Mont. 408 at 32, 10 P.3d 83 at 32.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See e.g. People v. Paquin, 811 P.2d 394, 398 (Colo. 1991) (sufficient that affidavit
"states that the informant provided information on past occasions that resulted in at
least one felony arrest") But see Commonwealth v. Rojas, 531 N.E.2d 255 (1988) (using
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warrant affidavit list the previous reliable information given by
the confidential informant. A more clearly defined standard
would allow the issuing magistrate to thoroughly examine the
informant's previous reliability.
Scenario 2: A local Fish and Game office receives a phone call from
an anonymous citizen. The informant states that she witnessed a
man shoot a deer this same day. The caller states that she is
aware that hunting season is over. She gives a description of the
shooter, along with a description of the shooter's vehicle and
license plate number. She states the incident took place near Gold
Creek by the Blackfoot River. The informant gives no information
concerning the circumstances where she came upon the alleged
poacher. The Fish and Game officer runs a check on the license
plate and determines the vehicle is registered to "Brad Jones" in
Bonner, Montana. Law enforcement investigates the Bonner
residence. They determine that Jones' vehicle is similar to the
vehicle described by the informant. The officers then question
Jones. His physical attributes are also similar to the alleged
poacher. The man denies the allegations.
Under these facts and the Reesman and Griggs analysis, an
issuing magistrate would most likely determine that the
evidence is insufficient to establish probable cause. Because the
anonymous informant's tip lacks reliability, police corroboration
is required. Under Griggs, the police corroboration must uncover indicia of criminal activity in order to establish probable
cause. Although law enforcement's independent investigation
supports the informant's allegations, there is no direct evidence
to support the poaching allegation. All of the facts given by the
informant are readily available and relate to innocent activity.
Therefore, the police corroboration would be insufficient to
resuscitate the anonymous informant's lack of reliability.
The situation changes dramatically if the tip was given by a
concerned citizen who gave his or her name to law enforcement.
As noted in Reesman, a tip given by an informant who witnesses
the criminal activity first-hand and is deemed reliable is
176
sufficient to establish probable cause.
This scenario demonstrates the possible futility of
anonymous informant tips. The facts are analogous to Griggs in
that police investigation may be limited in determining criminal

Aguilar-Spinelli standard, courts hold that a "naked assertion that in the past the
informant had provided information which led to a prior arrest is insufficient by itself to
establish an informant's veracity").
176. It is important to note that named informants who report who report false
information can be criminally prosecuted. Furthermore, they could face civil liability
under the doctrines of malicious prosecution and negligent false arrest.
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activity after an initial investigation. In Griggs, the court
suggested that an attempt by law enforcement to verify sales of
products necessary in an illegal mushroom growing operation
would have helped link Griggs to criminal activity. 177 But is this
standard practical?
Although methamphetamine manufacturing operations require specialized chemicals which are
possibly traceable, the same may not be true with marijuana or
hallucinogenic mushroom operations. In the end, law enforcement may be left with an anonymous tip, which is limited in
investigative value and eventually will become stale.
There are other considerations as well. Even though an
anonymous tip alone may not establish probable cause, it can
clearly be a starting point for a criminal investigation.
Investigators may use other search mechanisms to corroborate
the informant's reports. Garbage searches could be a powerful
tool for law enforcement to establish probable cause. The same
holds true for canine sniffs. Although warrantless thermal
imagery searches have been held unconstitutional under the
Montana Constitution, 7 8 there seems to be little in the way to
prevent law enforcement from utilizing this tool in a broader
search. By the same token, however, any unethical or illegal
searches by law enforcement raise the realistic possibility of
blowing an investigation that may have had hundreds or
thousands of hours invested.
VIII. CONCLUSION

From a policy standpoint, one might argue that Reesman is
yet another example of judicial activism by the Montana
Supreme Court. The court has recently been criticized for its
"misguided and impractical" decisions. 179 No doubt county
attorneys and law enforcement are frustrated with the court's
reversal of criminal convictions. It is the court's duty, however,
to uphold the law of the land, including the Montana State
Constitution. The thrust of Reesman holds that search warrants
based on allegations of unreliable informants and corroboration
of innocent facts simply will not establish probable cause under
the Montana Constitution. The decision merely defines the

177. Griggs, 2001 MT 211 at 51, 306 Mont. 366 at 51, 34 P.3d 101 at 51.
178. State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 934 P.2d 136 (1997).
179. Greg Tutle, Trial and Error, Billings Gazette, June 9, 2002, available at
http://www.billingsgazette.com/inkex.php?id= l &display=rednews/2002/06/09/buildlocal/
50-supco.inc.
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minimum probable cause requirements when using informants.
The Montana Supreme Court should recognize that the
Reesman test is a Gates hybrid because of the bright line rules
the court created. The Gates test, however, although subjective
in form, is not without its own parameters. The Montana
Supreme Court has merely identified some of these parameters
and set them out in a rule. Furthermore, some of the judicial
discretion from Gates remains in the police corroboration
determination laid out in State v. Griggs.
The court has also done a favor to law enforcement,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys. Scenarios such as the fact
patterns in Reesman and Griggs, which might be difficult to
recognize or qualify as sufficient probable cause in other jurisdictions, now have a predictable level of certainty in Montana.
Reesman's formula clearly identifies how informants can aid in
obtaining in search warrants. While there may be no exact
recipe for mulligan stew in Montana, we now know what not to
put in the stew.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/6

28

